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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

claim-preclusive effect. However, the Court averred that settlements,
generally, did not generate issue preclusion, unless the parties clearly
intended their agreement to have such effect. The Court further
stated that an issue preclusion argument was justified only when both a
legal or factual issue was actually litigated and determined by a valid
and final judgment, and such determination was essential to the
judgment. Accordingly, the Court held the Docket No. 320 judgment
did not preclude the United States and Reservation's claims for
increased water rights regarding the Reservation's disputed boundary
lands.
Finally, the Court approved the parties' proposed settlement
concerning the Colorado River Indian Reservation.
The Court remanded the United States and Reservation's water
rights claims, associated with the Reservation's disputed boundary
lands claims, to the Special Master for determination on the merits.
The Court declared that such claims were the last it would decide
regarding the lengthy Arizona v. California litigation. The Court
concluded that resolution of such claims allowed it to enter a final
consolidated decree, thus concluding this litigation.
SaraFranklin

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
SECOND CIRCUIT
S. Road Assocs. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 216 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding citizen suits under the Resource Conservation Recovery Act
("RCRA") alleging groundwater contamination must be brought
against persons or entities currently engaged in the specific RCRA
violations).
International Business Machines Corporation ("IBM") leased and
occupied property ("Site") from South Road Associates ("SRA")
starting in the mid-1950s for manufacturing, parts-cleaning, storage,
SRA acquired the
shipping, and other commercial operations.
property around 1979 and continued leasing the property to IBM until
the 1994 expiration of the lease. During this time IBM used and
stored chemicals on the Site classified by the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act ("RCRA") as solid and hazardous wastes. In 1981,
IBM became aware of potential environmental problems at the Site.
Through an internal investigation, IBM discovered that chemicals
stored in underground tanks leaked and contaminated the
surrounding soil, bedrock, and groundwater. In 1987, the New York
State Department of Environmental Conservation ("NYSDEC")
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declared the Site a significant threat to the public health and
environment and directed IBM to comply with state imposed
environmental obligations.
In March 1993, IBM successfully
petitioned NYSDEC to lower the classification of the Site thereby
releasing IBM from all state-imposed environmental obligations except
for continued monitoring. At the time of this suit, IBM was
monitoring the Site.
In December 1998, SRA sued IBM in the New York Supreme Court
for violations of RCRA's statutory and regulatory prohibitions against
"open dumping", common law breach of contract, and common law
unjust enrichment. IBM removed the action to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. IBM moved to
dismiss arguing SRA did not assert IBM was currently in the act of
contamination, which is required to maintain citizen suits under
RCRA. The district court granted IBM's motion and dismissed SRA's
federal claims against IBM. SRA appealed.
The Second Circuit Federal Court of Appeals reviewed SRA's
allegations that IBM's exceedences of maximum contamination levels
("MCLs") constituted violations of RCRA's "open dumps" and "open
dumping" provisions. The Second Circuit reviewed the language of
RCRA's citizen-suit provisions and concluded the provisions required
that IBM be engaged in the act of open dumping to constitute a
violation. The Second Circuit then reviewed the statutory definition of
"open dumping" and "open dump." However, the wording of
the
statute did not specify whether an on-going violation of the open
dumping provisions required on-going conduct. Therefore, to make
the determination, the Second Circuit reviewed the regulatory criteria
to classify solid waste disposal facilities and practices. The Second
Circuit determined facilities automatically violate RCRA regulations,
conditions, requirements, or prohibitions if facilities fail to follow any
of the open dumping provisions. SRA contended IBM violated the
open dumping provisions because IBM contaminated an underground
drinking water source past the solid waste boundary. SRA specifically
alleged IBM's past actions resulted in MCL exceedances in the
groundwater, which remained and contributed to groundwater
contamination. SRA contended that IBM's actions constituted a
violation of the provision prohibiting contamination of groundwater.
The Second Circuit disagreed and determined the definition of
"contaminate" means an act that introduces a substance that causes
MCL exceedances, not the MCL exceedances themselves. The Second
Circuit concluded the only way SRA could maintain the action was if its
complaint had alleged IBM was currently introducing substances into
the groundwater that caused the MCL exceedances. The Second
Circuit court found SRA's complaint only referred to the past MCL
exceedances. Additionally, the Second Circuit dismissed SRA's oral
allegations that IBM's remediation activities, which involved the
movement of contaminated soils, introduced wastes into the
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groundwater. The Second Circuit determined the movement of soils
pursuant to a state or federal remediation program does not constitute
an introduction of substances under RCRA.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of SRA's
federal claims.
William H. Fronczak
FOURTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding
sidecasting in a wetland is a discharge of a pollutant that violates the
Clean Water Act).
The United States sued James and Rebecca Deaton ("Deatons") for
allegedly violating the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by polluting a
wetland. The Deatons purchased a twelve-acre parcel of land in
Wicomico County, Maryland, to develop a residential subdivision. The
Wicomico County Health Department denied the Deatons' request for
a sewage disposal permit because the groundwater elevations were too
high and the drainage on the majority of the parcel was too poor. The
Deatons consulted the U.S. Department of Agriculture Soil
Conservation Service ("SCS"). A site examiner suggested that digging
a ditch through the middle of the property could correct the wetness
problem.
Before commencing any ditching work, the District Conservationist
at the SCS in Wicomico County further inspected the property. He
saw evidence of wetlands, including hydric soils, areas of standing
water, a large low wet area in the center of the parcel, and non-tidal
wetlands. He advised the Deatons that since wetlands existed on their
property, they would need to obtain a permit from the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") in order to begin digging. The Deatons
ignored this advice and hired a contractor to dig a 1,240-foot ditch
across the wetlands to drain the area. The contractor performed
sidecasting, a practice where the excavated dirt is piled on either side
of the ditch.
After learning of possible CWA violations on the Deaton property,
a Corps ecologist inspected the site. He concluded that wetlands were
present on the property and that all work should stop until the
Deatons obtained the requisite permit. The Deatons unsuccessfully
applied for a permit and thereafter spent three years working with
consultants to examine the property, negotiate with the Corps, and
prepare a remediation plan. With no remediation ever conducted on
the property, the government filed a civil complaint against the
Deatons for violation of the CWA for pollution of a regulated wetland.
The district court initially granted partial summary judgment to
the government. The district court concluded that any wetlands on
the Deatons' property were subject to the CWA and that sidecasting

